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GODTALK: SHOULD RELIGION INFORM
PUBLIC DEBATE?
J. David Bleich*

As a child, knee-high to a grasshopper, I heard a Yiddish maxim
from my grandmother. It wasn't really a maxim but an admonition,
and in translation it runs as follows: "If, when traveling in a coach
and wagon, the coachman drives past the door of a church and fails
to cross himself, get out immediately!" My grandmother, and others
of a bygone age to whom this rule was virtually self-evident, were not
making a pronouncement of theological significance. That admonition
had nothing to do with theology and everything to do with safety and
survival. They simply did not trust a person who was irreligious, and
that distrust was well founded. Voltaire, a doctrinaire atheist himself,
believed that atheism was safe only for intellectuals. He is reported
to have said, "I want my lawyer, tailor, valet, even my wife, to believe
in God. I think that if they do I shall be robbed less and cheated
less."
My problem: As I ride in a bus passing the National Cathedral
in Washington, the bus driver does not cross herself. Indeed, were
she· to cross herself, I am sure that on the morrow a suit would be
filed by the American Civil Liberties Union accompanied by an
amicus brief by the American Jewish Congress claiming that the
driver's conduct constitutes an infringement of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment because the bus driver is, after all, a
government employee, and the bus is indeed government property.
But the driver's failure to cross herself is not really my problem.
After all, I could refrain from using public transportation; indeed, in
New York City, many residents have rejected public transportation,
albeit for other reasons. My problem is much more basic. My
problem is that of the man who takes a fall and proceeds to consult
a physician. The doctor examines him, ascertains that there are no
broken bones, and tells the gentleman, "Forget about the fall. I want
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to know why you fell." I am not so much concerned about the fact
that the bus driver does not cross herself; I am concerned about why
the driver would consider crossing herself to constitute inappropriate
behavior.
Why is the introduction of religion into the public square
regarded as inappropriate and almost an embarrassment? Our society
tends to equate legality with morality. That which is legal is ipso
facto moral; only that which is illegal is immoral. Moreover, we live
in a society in which any constitutionally protected liberty is regarded
as a social imperative. The exercise of that liberty becomes, if I may
use the term, a mitzvah in the religion of secular humanism.
Examples: Friends serving in the pulpit rabbinate have told me
that, on occasion, when they have wished to deny their pulpits to
individuals such as the late Meir Kahane, they have been told by
congregants that, in the United States, there is an absolute right to
freedom of speech. Those well-meaning but misguided individuals are
not totally ignorant of the fact that the First Amendment serves only
as an impediment to government action but neither mandates nor bars
action in the private sphere. They are, however, convinced that any
form of expression that is immune from governmental interference is
deserving of encouragement.
The same type of confusion manifests itself in the abortion
debate. Abortion, in many circles, is regarded as an entitlement. The
line of reasoning seems to be as follows: The Supreme Court has
ruled that legal barriers to abortion constitute a violation of a
woman's right to privacy and has affirmed a woman's right to do with
her body as she chooses. Ergo, public policy should encourage her to
regard termination of a pregnancy as a morally neutral act and society
ought to facilitate her ability to secure an abortion. The liberties and
constraints enshrined in the Bill of Rights become not simply
limitations of governmental authority but societal mandates. The
elementary distinction between governmental interference in personal
freedoms and societal promotion of moral values has, in the minds of
many, become blurred beyond recognition.
Assuredly, history has taught us much regarding the danger of
permitting religion to dictate public mores. The nature of religion is
such that adherents of any particular religion often feel that they are
privy to absolute truth not only regarding matters of theology, but
also concerning standards of morality and even mundane aspects of
human conduct. Historically, the result has not infrequently been
discrimination against, and persecution of, individuals and sects who
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dissented from the teachings of the politically dominant religious
group. This country was founded as a haven for victims of religious
persecution. Tolerance is quite properly a cardinal virtue of democratic society. But tolerance should extend to all who, in practice, are
willing to reciprocate; it should not translate itself into intolerance of
some persons or ideologies because of fear based upon historical
experience. Long and deeply rooted traditions of freedom and
individual liberty serve as a powerful shield against domination of any
stripe.
Religion is a powerful force in shaping the tastes, desires, and
aspirations of many-and indeed it should be. Needs and desires
driven by religious conviction are no less real than those born of other
impulses; indeed they are likely to be much more intense. Precisely
because they are intense, they ought to be regarded as privileged
rather than dismissed as suspect. "To each according to his needs" is
firmly rooted in utilitarian principles. Maximization of the greatest
happiness for the greatest number necessitates recognition of intensity
of individual needs and desires. Individuals intuitively govern their
actions by such notions without necessarily formulating them as rules.
A person will instinctively give a spare concert ticket to a friend who
is a lover of music rather than to one who is simply curious to see the
inside of the concert hall. Taking the same principle one step further,
I am perfectly willing to forego a piece of chocolate cake in favor of
giving it to a child who will relish it far more than I. An employer
who willingly allows an employee an absence from work because of
religious observance, but is unsympathetic to a request for an
afternoon off to attend a ballgame, is not necessarily manifesting
respect for religion. If astute, the employer recognizes that those
desires are qualitatively different and call for different responses. In
the public arena, identification of religious concerns should serve as
a marker indicating that, even from the vantage point of a utilitarian
calculus, those concerns deserve enhanced weight.
Somewhat quixotically, admission of religious debate in the public
square might serve to mitigate the force of nonreligious arguments
advanced by religionists. The requirement that it is necessary to
establish a "secular purpose" in order to justify government action
results in situations in which the announced secular purpose is, at
times, an excuse rather than a reason. The religionist will argue the
merits of the secular purpose with far more rigor than he can accept
in good conscience, all the while hiding his real concern in pectore.
Thus, for example, the debate concerning welfare reform is restricted
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to the mundane, secular pros and cons. There certainly must be
human beings who simply believe that it is a sin to allow human
beings to go hungry. I strongly suspect that people opposed to
welfare reform on grounds that can best be described as theological
have not remained silent but have chosen to argue their case on
grounds of social well-being. Pragmatically speaking, that is probably
the more effective course; for my part, however, I would prefer a full
and frank dialogue.
Just a bit more than one hundred years ago, in Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States,1 Justice Brewer declared that "this is a
Christian nation. " 2 Today students of constitutional law find that
statement, if not embarrassing, at least quixotic. But at the time it
was written, the learned author found no contradiction between that
pronouncement and the (anti-)Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. At issue before the Court was an anti-immigration
statute. Toe declaration supported a finding that "[t]he common
understanding of the terms labor and laborers does not include
preaching and preachers. " 3 Lest anyone assume that members of the
clergy actually work, the Court found it necessary to add that it would
be unthinkable to assume that Congress, in enacting an anti-immigration statute, intended to bar an invitation to Anglican clergy to
minister to the religious needs of U.S. citizens.
But the declaration resonates with a more profound meaning. It
clearly reflects a literal interpretation of the Establishment Clause as
prohibiting only an established state church but in no way precluding
governmental preference of religion and religious values. Toe framers
of the Constitution certainly envisioned a Christian nation, de facto
if not de jure. Indeed, the Bill of Rights did not at all interfere in the
ongoing relationship with established religions that then existed in
nine of the thirteen states. Toe last of these states disestablished
religion in 1833. Quite to the contrary, the First Amendment was
designed to prevent the establishment of a national church that would
effectively supplant the churches established by the various states. As
a matter of historical fact, the Bill of Rights was made binding upon
the individual states, rather than upon the federal government
exclusively, only after the various state churches had long been
disestablished.
1. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
2. Id. at 471.
3. Id. at 463.
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In the cultural milieu that we have created, conduct or action that
would violate constitutional norms if governmental activity were
involved becomes a violation of socially accepted mores when
displayed in the public square. Thus the (anti)-Establishment Clause
in the Bill of Rights is no longer simply a restriction upon government
conduct but comes to be regarded as a restraint upon public debate,
ultimately a de facto constraint upon individual conduct.
I do not at all pretend that the First Amendment is the only
reason, or even the principal reason, for the lack of religiosity, if I
may call it such, in American society. Certainly it is not. But it
seems to me that the First Amendment has made its small contribution to the creation of an areligious society. I frankly regard the First
Amendment as a failed experiment. Yet, I hasten to add that I would
not want to live in a society that does not boast of a First Amendment or a functional equivalent thereof. But the desire for the
protection afforded by the First Amendment should not prevent us
from recognizing that neither of its clauses always achieved the effect
we want.
The constitutional separation of church and state has clearly
given rise to a certain embarrassment about the recognition of religion
and religious values in public affairs. As a result, if a religious
denomination has strong views on a particular public issue, it may be
sure that its position will be dismissed as sectarian and hence
unworthy of serious attention. Values nurtured by religious conviction are to be left at the church or synagogue door; they are not to
influence or even inform public debate. To paraphrase a Jewish
writer of the Enlightenment: Be God-fearing in private, but an
agnostic in public.4
My own reaction to Justice Brewer's declaration in Church of the
Holy Trinity is: "Amen. Would that the United States were indeed
a Christian nation!" 5 However, as a Jew who is also a member of a
law school faculty, I find it necessary to append an "oral law"
interpretation. The interpretation may be found in the last scene of
the play Nathan the Wise 6 by the German poet Lessing in which

4. Judah Leib Gordon, Hakitzah Ami, In KITVEI YEHUDAH LEIB GORDON: SHIRAH
17 (1959).
5. Holy Trinity , 143 U .S. at 471.
6. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Nathan der Weise, in LESSING'S NATHAN DER WEISE
(Sylvester Primer ed., 1906).
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Nathan is told: "Nathan, Nathan, indeed you are a Christian."7 To
this Nathan responds by saying, "That which you call a Christian in
me, I call a Jew in you." 8 Or, as Justice Douglas put it succinctly in
Zorach v. Clausen, 9 "We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being." 10 To be effective in the public
square, religion need not, and should not, be sectarian in nature.
In some sectors of our community, to engage in activity that can
be regarded, even remotely, as an encroachment upon separation of
church and state is regarded as sacrilegious; to question the wisdom
of maintaining a hermetically sealed wall is nothing less than heresy.
Indeed, at times it would appear that the covenant of Philadelphia has
supplanted the covenant of Sinai as the credo of American society
and that the first ten amendments command a devotion far in excess
of that paid to the Ten Commandments. Modern-day devotees of the
Constitution would erect impregnable fences around this wall just as
the Jewish sages of old erected fences around the Law of Moses.
There is no gainsaying the fact that Jefferson's "wall of separation" has contributed to an erosion of religious awareness in the
public life in our country. This was certainly not the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution.
The First Amendment . . . does not say that in every and all
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State ....
[W]e find no constitutional requirement which makes it
necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to
throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope
of religious influence. 11
Thus spake a Supreme Court Justice whose credentials as a liberal are
unimpeachable-Justice William Douglas writing for the majority in
Zorach.
It is sometimes forgotten that the First Amendment was intended
to be binding only upon the federal government, not upon the
individual states. Matters of religion were to be dealt with by the
individual states as they saw fit. Indeed, as noted earlier, at the time
th'at the First Amendment was inscribed to all eternity upon tablets
of constitutional stone, established churches existed in nine of the

7, Id, at 169.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 313.
Id. at 312, 314.
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original states. It was not until a Supreme Court decision handed
down in 1940, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 12 that the Bill of Rights was
held to be binding upon state governments by virtue of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 13 and not until 1947
in Everson v. Board of Education 14 that the Court declared that the
Establishment Clause applies with equal force to state governments.15
Let us put questions of constitutional jurisprudence aside for a
moment. Do we want Johnny to pray? Do we want teenagers to be
exposed to the concept of a personal God? Do we want the
coachman to make the sign of the cross when passing a church?
"Yes!" comes the response, "but not in school and not on public
property." Fair enough, until one realizes that: (1) Far too many
parents are unconcerned with such matters with the result that their
children do not receive even minimal exposure to experiences that
might be even remotely categorized as religious; and (2) Studied
avoidance of all things religious in public contexts may become
tantamount to the public negation of all religion. In the words of
Justice Douglas such a result "would be preferring those who believe
in no religion over those who do believe," 16 a state of affairs quite
antithetical to the goal the First Amendment was designed to achieve.
Heaven forfend that these comments be in any way construed as
advocating the states' right either to engage in religious indoctrination
or to interfere in the slightest with religious freedom. But we must
recognize, as did former Chief Justice Burger in Walz v. Tax Commission,11 that "[n]o perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the
very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts-one
that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement." 18
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . .. " 19 The Free Exercise Clause prohibits any
form of religious coercion; the Establishment Clause proscribes
government endorsement or overt assistance to religious endeavors

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Id. at 303.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 14-16.
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Id. at 670.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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even were there to be unanimous consent on the part of the populace.
Everyone agrees that free exercise is, and must remain, an absolute.
Toe alternative is the loss of religious liberty.
But it is not at all clear that religious liberty is incompatible with
even a formal establishment of religion. Toe religious liberty of Jews,
Moslems, Hindus, Sikhs, and members of various cults and sundry is
in no way diminished-at least today-in Great Britain by virtue of
the unique position of the Church of England as the established
church of the realm. On the contrary, establishment serves to
mitigate only the freedom of the established church and its communicants which, by virtue of its establishment, is technically subject to the
whims of Parliament.
In our country, establishment is unthinkable, not simply because
of the constitutional prohibition, but because establishment is
regarded as carrying with it an aura bordering at least on the mildly
coercive. But there is no need to throw out the baby with the bath
water. Toe Supreme Court has wisely drawn repeated distinctions
between "establishment" and "accommodation." The former is
anathema; the latter commendable. The problem is where to draw
the line.
It is certainly difficult to draw a line that will permit the desired
result but not yield logical inconsistencies that can ultimately
obliterate the line entirely. Nor should it be forgotten that denial of
services and benefits for fear of violating the Establishment Clause is
itself a diminution of the free exercise of religion. In Walz the Court
sagaciously observed that there is an inherent tension between the
Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses, "both of which are cast
in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical
extreme, would tend to clash with the other. "20 We may wish
Johnny to pray in school but nevertheless recognize that such a goal
is constitutionally unattainable. That should not automatically lead
us to reject moments of silence as, constitutionally speaking, equally
odious. The challenge is to recognize the goal and to fashion the
means. Toe goal should be nondiscriminatory encouragement of
religious activity to the fullest extent possible within the parameters
of the First Amendment.
Odd as it may sound, such a policy need not be regarded as at
variance from the tripartite test of constitutionality adopted by the

20. Walz , 397 U .S. at 668-69.
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Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 21
Encouragement of
religious awareness serves a very tangible secular purpose. Let us put
aside the very real denominational interest in financial support of
parochial school education. Is it not in the interests of all Americans
to foster parochial school education for all citizens who wish to avail
themselves of such an opportunity? Juvenile delinquency and drug
use are demonstrably far less prevalent among students of those
schools than among the general teenage population. That represents
a tangible secular benefit to all Americans.
In Everson v. Board of Education the Supreme Court declared
assistance to parochial schools in the form of bus transportation to be
constitutional on the somewhat tenuous ground that the program was
designed to assure the safety of children rather than to promote
religious education. 22 In Board of Education v. Allen23 the Court
permitted the state to provide textbooks of a secular nature for use
in parochial schools on the grounds that the benefit was to parents
and children, not to schools. 24 Is not a tuition subsidy to defray the
cost of hiring a teacher of mathematics but the logical and functional
equivalent of the purchase of secular textbooks? Here, too, the
benefit is to parents and children, not to religion. As Justice Powell
stated in Hunt v. McNair, 25 "[T]he Court has not accepted the
recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect
of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious
ends." 26
The Supreme Court has indeed long struggled with attempts to
determine when permissible accommodation rises to the level of
proscribed establishment. Perhaps at least a partial resolution lies in
an understanding of the history of the development of First Amendment protection of religion. The originally proposed text of the First
Amendment, a text not promulgated, read: "The civil rights of none
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall

21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Id. at 612-13.
22. Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
23. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
24. Id. at 243-44.
25. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
26. Id. at 743.
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any national religion be established."27 The function of the latter
clause was explicitly limited to preventation of the rise of an institution in the nature of a national established church to the prejudice of
denominations not accorded that recognition. The right to institute
an Established Church-or not to do so-was a right jealously
preserved to the individual states. The thrust of the proposed text
was not to bar aid to religion but to bar the preference of one
denomination over others. Assuredly, it was not designed to render
the federal government and its institutions areligious in nature. Quite
apart from original intent, the phrase "establishment of religion" as
it appears in the text actually adopted, could readily be interpreted as
referring to religious worship, public adoration, ritual, ceremony, and
the like. In that context, one could readily understand that all forms
of aid to religion are interdicted by the First Amendment. Even
Justice Black's formulation in Everson prohibiting "aid [to] one
religion . . . [or] all religions" 28 and "aid," understood-contra
Douglas-as connoting not simply financial aid but as encompassing
other forms of aid as well, is sound doctrine with regard to establishment of religion in the sense of worship and other forms of public
adoration. However, the policy concerns that bar establishment of
religion in that sense are not directly relevant to the values, principles,
morals, or even the basic teachings of religion which, in a significant
sense, are so much more fundamental and so much more important.
It should also be noted that it was only with some degree of
reluctance that the Supreme Court came to recognize that religious
practices other than prayer and similar acts of divine service are
protected by the First Amendment. Religion for a Protestant, after
all, is not centered upon ritual observances and restrictions, but is
fairly well circumscribed by prayer, church attendance, and Bible
reading.
Perhaps we should recognize that such a limited understanding
of the connotation of the term "religion" is not entirely incorrect.
Accordingly, it may be argued that religion should be understood,
constitutionally speaking, as a homonym employed with diverse
connotations in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. We
must insist that the Free Exercise Clause is designed to protect
religious practice in the broadest sense of that term but urge that the

27. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis added).
28. Everson, 330 U .S. at 15.
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parallel clause prohibiting establishment of religion be regarded as
limiting governmental entanglement with religion in the narrow sense
of the term "religion," worship, and overt profession of a creed. This
semantic point serves to bolster Professor Lawrence Tribe's argument
that anything "arguably nonreligious" should not be considered
religious in applying the Establishment Clause. 29
Recognition that the ambit of "religion" proscribed by the
Establishment Clause is far less encompassing than the ambit
protected by the Free Exercise Clause certainly comes closer to
capturing the spirit of the First Amendment than other attempts to
resolve the tension between the two clauses. In the words of former
Chief Justice Burger: "[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clause
of the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity. " 30 It did not connote a mandate for
neutrality between religion and the absence thereof. Nor, as Chief
Justice Rehnquist has stated, is there anything in the Establishment
Clause which requires government to be strictly neutral between
religion and irreligion. On the contrary, as Justice Douglas remarked,
"When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with
religious authorities ... it follows the best of our traditions." 31
Strange as it may seem to many lay people, but as students of
constitutional law would readily concede, the development of First
Amendment doctrine over the past two hundred years is rooted, not
in transcendental truth or in the application of esoteric hermeneutical
principles, but in what the Court perceives to be good for our
society-surely a matter over which reasonable people may differ.
The policy that reflects a view of societal welfare that recognizes the
singular contribution of religion to the betterment of society was
perhaps best expressed by Chief Justice Burger in Walz:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment
and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or
governmental interference with religion. Short of those
expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for
play in the j~ints productive of a benevolent neutrality which

29. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 14-6, at 828 (1978).

30. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668.
31. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14.
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will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship
and without interference. 32
Read in the manner herein proposed, the First Amendment-or
better, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment-acquires
a meaning entirely different from its broad interpretation in scores of
judicial decisions. Of course, this line of argument will hardly be
regarded as respectable in academic circles, certainly not within legal
academic circles. And recognition that this type of advocacy is not
respectable becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If one regards a
certain position as somewhat less than respectable, one does not
engage in discourse advocating that position. Failure to engage in
that type of conversation confirms its lack of respectability and the
wall of separation is thereby reinforced not only as a wall between
church and state but as a wall between religion and the public square.
Accordingly, religious concerns, even when introduced into the public
square, lose their validity. But the converse is also true: Religious
concerns presented in public discourse again and again dispel
embarrassment and become self-validating. But in order for religion
to become present in the public square we must first overcome the
reticence from which we all suffer. Who knows? Maybe if we
succeed in overcoming these inhibitions the course of First Amendment jurisprudence might even be reversed or at least modified.

32. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.

